The communication between an honest prover and an honest verifier can be intercepted by a malicious man-in-the-middle (MiM), without the legitimate interlocutors noticing the intrusion. The attacker can simply relay messages from one party to another, eventually impersonating the prover to the verifier and possibly gaining the privileges of the former. This sort of simple relay attacks are prevalent in wireless communications (e.g., RFID-based protocols) and can affect several infrastructures from contactless payments to remote car-locking systems and access-control verification in high-security areas. As the RFID/NFC technology prevails, a practical and increasingly popular countermeasure to these attacks is given by distance-bounding protocols. Yet, the security of these protocols is still not mature. Importantly, the implications of the return channel (i.e., knowing whether the protocol finished successfully or not) in the security of some distance-bounding protocols have not been fully assessed. In this paper, we demonstrate this by a series of theoretical and practical attacks. We first show that the Bussard-Bagga protocol DBPK-Log does not fulfill its goal: it offers no protection against distance fraud and terrorist fraud. Then, we show how to mount several concrete MiM attacks against several follow-up variants, including the protocol by Reid et al.
devices [18, 26, 27] , wireless ad-hoc networks [11, 14, 38] , sensor networks [29] , etc.
The importance of distance-bounding protocols in preventing relay attacks can be easily assessed if we simply look at nowadays ubiquitous applications such as access-control to high-security areas and contactless payments. Indeed, relay attacks have also been launched against bankcards [16] and the demonstrated countermeasure against this type of attacks was again based on an implementation of a distance-bounding protocol [16] . Another aspect to consider is that of car manufacturers, who are now using RFID protocols to lock/unlock cars remotely, even if these protocols are themselves susceptible to relay attacks [17] . Thus, there is a stringent need for secure distance-bounding protocols in order to safeguard the growingly spread use of, e.g., RFID-based security-sensitive protocols.
Some MiM attacks also assume that the adversary has access to a side channel showing whether the protocol completed successfully or not. In the case of, e.g., car-locking systems, this would just consist in looking at whether the car opens. We call this the return channel. In the RFID community, it was not immediate to realize that the return channel strongly influences the security of the protocols therein invoked. For instance, the HB+ protocol [23] was proposed to resist MiM attacks, but-as soon as the adversary is given access to the return channel [19] the protocol was found in fact vulnerable to MiM attacks. In the formalism by Vaudenay [40] , adversaries with no access to the return channel are called narrow adversaries. Again, addressing non-narrow adversaries in RFID proved challenging. In this paper, we show how non-narrow adversaries can successfully mount a series of attacks on several DB protocols.
Distance-bounding protocols should resist to distance fraud. I.e., a malicious prover who is far away from a verifier should not succeed to pass the protocol. Another well established threat model against distance-bounding is the so-called notion of terrorist fraud [15] . In this model, a malicious prover who is far away from a verifier tries to mount a distance fraud with the help of an adversary, but without giving him any credential or an advantage that he may later abuse. To defeat terrorist fraud, Bussard and Bagga [8] [9] [10] proposed a protocol in which passing the distance-bounding phase would require the knowledge of a key. Many follow-up protocols were inspired from [8] [9] [10] .
Contribution & Structure. In this paper, we first look at the Bussard-Bagga DBPK-Log protocols [8] [9] [10] . We show that its main goals, namely, resistance to distance fraud and terrorist fraud, are not fulfilled. Then, we consider variants and successors. We provide a non-narrow MiM adversary who tries to learn the credential (i.e., the distance-bounding secret key) from an honest prover. This will enable the MiM to impersonate the prover during the distance-bounding phase at a later stage. Consequently, a distance-bounding protocol susceptible to these attacks would not be compliant with its very raison d'être. Namely, we show concrete forms of this MiM attack mounted onto variants/successors of the Bussard-Bagga protocols [9, 10] e.g., instances of the Reid et al. protocol [34] . Whilst the main pattern of the attacks follows a simple idea [25] and our extension on it, these frauds become possible via pretty intricate statistical and general theoretical analyses that we detail herein. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we remind the structure of numerous [34, 39] distance-bounding protocols, and we explain the idea behind a basic MiM attack-scenario [25] that can be launched against this family of distance-bounding protocols. We conclude this section by showing how to extend this simple attack, potentially rendering it more dangerous. In Section 4, we describe several MiM attacks, concrete instantiations of the scenario presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the Bussard and Bagga [8] [9] [10] or the so-called DBPK-Log (distance-bounding proof of knowledge based on the discrete logarithm) protocols. We mount a distance fraud and a terrorist fraud against DBPK-Log and motivate to consider variants and successors of DBPK. In Section 4 we consider several proposed encryption functions to be used inside the DBPK distance-bounding protocols and variants, and we expose their failures. In Section 4.4, we present the implementation and evolution of the most elaborate of these attacks, mounted onto the most involved successor of the DBPK distance-bounding protocol proposed in [8, 9] . In Section 5, we briefly discuss about the possible fixes to the DB protocols exposed to our kind of threat. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Distance-Bounding & MiM Attacks
We first describe a family of distance-bounding protocols [34, 39] that use similar methods to generate the responses to be employed in the challenge/response phase. Figure 1 depicts a general view of this family of protocols.
More precisely, in all the protocols that belong in this family, the following steps are executed.
-Initialization phase: Let the prover P and the verifier V share a secret key x. This initialization phase is not time critical and is executed as follows. The verifier V chooses a random number N V and transmits it to the prover P . After receiving N V , the prover P also chooses a random number N P and computes a session key a such that a = f x (C, N V , N P ), where f denotes a pseudorandom function (PRF) and C represents any additional parameters that may be required, e.g., the identifiers of the prover P and the verifier V . We should note here that the computation of the session key a varies. In particular, in the protocol in [39] the session key a depends on both random nonces N V and N P . -Distance-bounding phase: This time-sensitive phase starts right after the initialization phase and involves the exchange of challenges-responses at maximum bit-rate over a period of time. It is repeated m times (rounds), with i varying from 1 to m. The actual number of rounds m is normally dictated by a security parameter. At each round i, the challenge-response delay ∆t i is measured. V starts by choosing a random bit c i , initializing the clock with zero and transmitting c i to P . The values received by P are denoted by c i . Next, P answers by sending
Assuming noiseless communication, we can denote the values received by V also by r i . Upon receiving r i , V stops the clock and stores the received answer and the delay time ∆t i .
After the end of the distance-bounding phase, a final verification phase is performed. The verifier V checks the correctness of the received responses and if the response-times ∆t i are bellow the maximum allowed response-time 2B. At the end of this phase the verifier V indicates if the prover P is authenticated or not (Out V = 1 or Out V = 0, respectively).
On noisy/noiseless channels. On the one hand, some of the DB provers used in distance-bounding are cheap and, whilst having time constraints also, do not usually cater for error correction. On the other hand, adversaries can be equipped with powerful devices which are less error-prone and/or are also able to correct all the errors/noise of the channels. For simplicity, we will mainly consider noiseless channels in our MiM attacks to follow. However, we note here that noise can be considered easily [21] . I.e., we can augment the model, requiring that the verifier allows at most m − τ incorrect answers (answers with errors or delayed).
Consider the probability p of one response being correct (non-erroneous and not delayed). Then, the probability that at least τ responses out of m are of the correct kind is given by
This could then be easily factored into the success probability of our attacks.
On (the feasibility of ) MiM attacks. The MiM attacks to be described in here are mounted along the following intuitive pattern. In a learning phase, the MiM adversary A can "play" with a prover P , which could be close to V , and "play" with a verifier V . The subsequent attack phase allows interaction several times with a far-away prover and one time with the verifier. We should note here that if the legitimate prover is located far-away from the legitimate verifier then the MiM attack can be easily deployed. But, we believe that MiM attacks with a prover and his neighboring verifier are also easy to mount when the adversary can initiate protocols with both of them, using a different channel with each. For instance, an attacker could interfere with the initial frequency-synchronization phase so that each of the participants (prover and verifier) would end up communicating with the adversary through two different channels (i.e., frequency bands). Then, the prover does not even realize that another concurrent conversation is taking place (as such a prover and the verifier cannot confer, i.e., two users cannot communicate with each other as long as they "occupy" different frequency bands). [25] : A Case in Point for DB Insecurity. Linear, active MiM attacks can be launched against any protocol from the family in Figure 1 . The generic sketch of these attacks was briefly described 1 in [25] against [39] . In this attack, a powerful, non-narrow adversary A acts as an active MiM during the distance-bounding phase. We consider a scenario where a legitimate verifier and a prover run successfully the initialization phase of the distance-bounding protocol and both of them compute the session key a (see Figure 1 ). We further assume that the prover and the verifier are close to each other. During the distance-bounding phase, the adversary injects a modified version c j of a challenge c j (for some fixed j ∈ {1, . . . , n}). Let r i be the response that the attacker sends to V for c i and r i be the response that the prover sends to A. In fact, the attacker will act such that r i = r i for i = j and will let r j be a random bit. In noiseless condition, it is the case that by looking at the output of the verifier and knowing what choice he made for r j , this non-narrow attacker can make a simple calculation to find the jth bit of the key x, i.e., :
Non-Narrow MiM Attack by Flipping One Challenge
And, to this end, the Swiss-Knife protocol [25] was designed to defeat this attack by introducing a MAC in the protocol exchanges.
By repeating this strategy for j = 1, . . . , m, the adversary is able to deduce all the bits of the secret key x. In noiseless conditions, the success probability of the attack is 1. We now extend this attack in [25] to flipping more than one challenge in one distance-bounding session. We will use both flavors of this scenario in what follows.
An Extended Variant of Non-Narrow MiM Attacks: Flipping a Batch of Challenges.
As a variant of this attack, the attacker can select a "small size" batch of challenges, i.e., J ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, and do c j =c j for all j ∈ J and c i = c i for all i / ∈ J. Let the responses r j s by the attacker for all j ∈ J be as he pleases and let r i = r i for all i / ∈ J. If Out V = 1, the attacker deduces x j = r j ⊕ r j , for all j ∈ J. This happens with probability 2 −|J| in a single protocol version, but may allow the finding of a batch of the bits of the key at once.
The Bussard-Bagga Protocols and Terrorist Fraud

The Bussard-Bagga Protocols
Bussard and Bagga have proposed in [8] [9] [10] a distance-bounding protocol relying on public key cryptography, e.g., commitments and proofs of knowledge. It is also called DBPK (distance-bounding proof of knowledge). The protocol uses a proof of knowledge in order to protect against terrorist frauds.
In the generic DBPK protocol, the prover P has a secret key x and a published certificate on its public key y = Γ (x). The protocol is composed of four phases: the initialization phase, the distance-bounding phase, the phase for the opening of commitments therein used, and the proof of knowledge phase.
-Initialization phase:
In the initialization phase, the prover generates a random secret session key k ∈ R {0, 1} m and uses this session key in order to encrypt his private key x. The encryption of x is done using a publicly known symmetric key encryption method E : {0,
m . Thus, we have e = E k (x). Of course, the knowledge of both e and k reveals the private key x, i.e., x = D k (e), where D k is the decryption function inverting, under k, the encryption E k . After encrypting x and computing e, the prover P uses a secure bit commitment scheme to commit to each bit of k and e using randomnesses v and v respectively. More precisely, if we let i be a bit-index (i ∈ 1, . . . , m), then the commitments to the ith bit of the session key k and of the key e are respectively denoted as
-Distance-Bounding phase: In the distance-bounding phase, a number of m single-bit challenge-response exchanges take place at maximum bit rate. At each round i, the challenge-response delay ∆t i is measured. The verifier V selects a random bit as the challenge c i and the prover responds with a response r i such that -Commitments' opening phase: In this phase, the prover P opens some commitments on the bits of k and e corresponding to his answers in the distance-bounding phase. I.e., to vouch for his DB responses, the prover sends the randomness v i to open z k,i if challenge i was 0, and he sends v i otherwise. This is denoted in Figure 2 through sending the value γ i . In case that the openings of z k,i and z e,i do not pass, the verifier V sends an error notification message to the prover P .
-Proof of knowledge phase: In this phase, the prover P convinces the verifier V with a zero-knowledge interaction that he has generated the commitments which correspond to a unique private key x and this private key corresponds to the public key y that is used by the verifier to authenticate the prover. The proof of knowledge is denoted as
where the knowledge of α, β is being proven, while z, y are as per the protocol, known to the verifier. In the protocol, we have y = Γ (x) and z = Ω(x, (v, v )). The value of z can be computed from the z k,i and z e,i .
The number m of DB rounds and the size m of the key is dictated by a security parameter. Typically, m varies between 128 and 1024.
Commitments and the Proof of Knowledge in DBPK-Log
The only instances of DBPK providing concrete commitments and proofs of knowledge are based on the discrete logarithm in Z * p and are called DBPK-Log. We now describe these commitments and proofs of knowledge.
We use a strong prime p,
, and obtain that
The proposed encryption methods use e = (ux − k) mod (p − 1) with either u = 1 [10] or u random and publicly revealed [8, 9] . So, the proof of knowledge consists of proving knowledge of x and v such that y = g x and z = g ux h v in Z p . The proof of knowledge [9] is repeating t times what follows: the prover sends w 1 = g uρ1 h ρ2 mod p for some random ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ Z p−1 ; the verifier sends some challenge c ∈ {0, 1}; the prover responds by s 1 = ρ 1 − cx mod (p − 1) and x 2 = ρ 2 − cv mod (p − 1); the verifier checks w 1 = z c g us1 h s2 mod p and w 2 = y c g s1 mod p.
Terrorist Fraud and Distance Fraud against DBPK-Log
We now show that the public-key techniques which are used in the DBPK-Log protocol are ineffective to defeat terrorist fraud. For this, we consider a malicious prover who is far away from an honest verifier. There is an adversary close to the verifier who will get some help from the prover to pass the protocol without getting any advantage to further impersonate the prover. The attack is sketched in Fig. 3 . First, the malicious prover selects u and v ∈ Z p−1 (with either u = 1 or a random u, as specified in DBPK-Log), then computes z = g ux h v mod p and sends z to the adversary. The adversary selects some random k i , e i , v i , v i ,  i = 1, . . . , m, and a random bit c 1 . Then, he computes z k,i = commit(k i , v i ) and  z e,i = commit(e i , v i ) for i = 2, . . . , m. If c 1 = 0, he sets z k,1 = commit(k 1 , v 1 
. It is also clear that since the proof-of-knowledge is zero-knowledge and that x is not used anywhere else, that the adversary learns no information about x. So, it is a valid terrorist fraud.
Distance Fraud. In distance-fraud settings, the malicious prover could simulate the adversary in the above attack and select k i = e i , i = 2, . . . , m. This way, the prover could answer to c i by r i = k i = e i before receiving the challenge c i and therefore making the correct response to arrive on time to the verifier.
Equivalently, a malicious prover could just simulate the honest prover selecting k ≈ x 2 and u = 1 and answering to the challenges by anticipation. Concretely, if x is even, the malicious prover can select k = e = 
Non-Narrow MiM Attacks against DBENC
We now consider the protocol by Reid et al. [34] which is a variant of DBPK no longer based on public-key cryptography. Indeed, the prover and the verifier now share the secret x. In addition to this, k and e are derived from PRF computations (done at both sides) based on x and some nonces. (See Fig. 4 .) This protocol, that we call DBENC, has no longer any commitment or proof of knowledge phase.
Clearly, the attack scenario in Section 2 lends itself to concrete attacks against the DBENC protocol. First consider that a non-narrow MiM adversary specializes in the batch-version of the attack on the DB phase. Namely, let first |J| ≥ 2. [34] This attacker selects indexes J ⊆ {1, . . . , m} for flipped challenges. Then, for this protocol, with probability 2 −|J| , he obtains the following: 1. the bits e j and k j , for all j ∈ J; 2. either the bit e i or the bit k i , when j / ∈ J. Secondly, for the case that |J| = 1, the success probability of the attacker is 1, as per Section 2. In any case, depending the encryption algorithm, this can help in recovering some piece of information about x.
The designers of DBPK and DBENC suggest [8] [9] [10] 34] several possible encryption methods (E) to be used therein. In the next subsections, we consider them in a case-by-case fashion (see Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3), showing the concrete MiM attack that would break the corresponding instance of the DBENC protocol. In DBPK-Log, the encryption is based on the modulo p − 1 arithmetic. We fully describe attacks in these cases (Sections 4.2 and 4.3).
MiM Attack on the "One-Time-Pad DBENC"
We consider here that E k (x) = x ⊕ k is to be used as the encryption inside the DBENC protocol, with x ∈ {0, 1} m and k ∈ U {0, 1} m . We denote it simply by e = x⊕k. Of course, for any bit position i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we then have e i = x i ⊕k i . Hence, the attack-schema in Section 2, recovers x j = e j ⊕ k j (for j ∈ J) by using a single session with a flipped challenge c j . By iterating at most m times (in the single-flip case), he fully recovers x.
Reid et al. [34] suggested to use a "semantically secure encryption function" and proposed one-time pad: E k (x) = x ⊕ k. Clearly, instances of DBENC based on one-time pad fall under the attack in Section 2.
MiM Attack on the "Addition Modulo n DBENC"
We consider here that E k (x) = x − k mod n is to be used as the encryption inside the DBENC protocol, with x ∈ Z n , k ∈ U Z n , and some fixed n of m bits. 4 We denote this encryption simply by e = x − k mod n. Clearly, we have
where c = 1 k>x . For e 1 = lsb(e), we have
This can be written as
The actual tactics of the attack will be separated into subcases, upon the characteristic of n, e.g., considering whether n is odd or even. Some of these sub-cases contain cross-references to one another.
The n even case.
• The subcase where n = 2 m . For n = 2 m , of course, n 1 = 0. Then, based on (1), we reduce to e 1 = x 1 ⊕ k 1 . Hence, our attacker recovers x 1 = e 1 ⊕ k 1 by using a single session. Then, once he learned x 1 , he can recover x 2 by employing the fact that e 2 = x 2 ⊕ k 2 ⊕x 1 k 1 . To see this, first note that if the query to the prover reveals e 1 , the adversary can infer k 1 = e 1 ⊕ x 1 . Otherwise, the query reveals k 1 anyway. Hence, we can take for granted that k 1 is known to the attacker. Since a second iteration of our attack recovers e 2 and k 2 , he can clearly deduce x 2 = e 2 ⊕ k 2 ⊕x 1 k 1 . He can continue further to uncover all bits of x using m iterations.
• The subcase where n = 2 m n with n odd. Let n = 2 m n with n odd. Again, we are in the case where e = (x − k) mod 2 m n . So, we have e ≡ x − k (mod 2 m ). Thus, using the previous attack, the attacker can first recover x 1 , . . . , x m using m iterations. Then, he will have to employ the attackscenario for the case for a modulus which is odd, here for n ; this case is stated below. Combining the two results will give the attacker the bits x 1 , . . . , x m of x.
The n odd case.
• Calculating the least significant bit in the n odd case. For n odd, we have n 1 = 1. Then, based on (1), we have e 1 = x 1 ⊕ k 1 ⊕ c where c = 1 k>x . Let p = P[c = 1], then it holds that
Hence, when x is far from n/2, c is strongly biased. On the one hand, if x > n/2, most of c's are 0, so x 1 is the majority of the obtained e 1 ⊕ k 1 . On the other hand, if x < n/2, x 1 is the complement of the majority of the obtained e 1 ⊕ k 1 .
Assuming that the adversary first guesses whether x > n/2, then he deduces x 1 by mounting a statistical attack. In more detail, assume that the adversary tries N sessions, i.e.,:
where c i depends on the session i since k is refreshed in every session. The adversary uses a majority function to find x 1 such as
More precisely, P[Bit i = x 1 ⊕ 1 x<n/2 ] = 1/2 + |p − 1/2|. Thus, thanks to the Chernoff bound (Lemma 2, in the Appendix),
We can just take N ≈ (1/2 − (x + 1)/n) −2 to deduce x 1 by the guess 1 x<n/2 .
• Calculating the i-th least significant bit in the n odd case. Assuming that x 1 , . . . , x i−1 have been recovered (possibly from a guess on the sign of x − n/2), similarly as before, the queries to the prover leak k 1 , . . . , k i−1 . Thus, based on (1), we have
where c = 1 k>x and B is a Boolean function computing the carry on the ith bit in x − k + cn. To express the dependence of B on the overall value of c, we write
There are many cases where α(k 1 , . . . , k i−1 , x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ) = 0 (i.e., B does not depend on c and can be computed by the attacker using just the information on the bits 0 to i − 1 of the known parts). So, by Equation (2), the attacker can recover x i in one session. There are rare cases in which we have
Such a case is given by i = 0, as shown in the last paragraph. So, in these corner cases, a statistical attack is needed in order to recover x i .
• Calculating several most significant bits and the least significant one bit in the n odd case. Going back to the attack on the least significant bit, we realize that the statistics on the estimate of P[c = 1] = P[k > x] reveals several most significant bits of x.
and we can recover the most significant bits of x by using Hoeffding's Bound (Lemma 1, in the Appendix), i.e.,
To recover the most significant bits, we set ε = 2 − and N = 2 2 . Notice that this attack is similar to the statistical attack described before, hence, the attacker can get x 1 , as well.
• Calculating the least significant bit in the n odd case, revisited. Assuming that the adversary guesses the most significant bit x m of x, then he pays attention to (x m , c m , r m ). In many cases, c can be deduced non-ambiguously from this. For instance, if c m = 0 (so r m = k m ) and x m = r m , then c = k m for sure. In the case where x m = 0, if c m = 1 (so r m = e m ) and r m = 1, then c = 1 for sure. If c cannot be deduced, the adversary waits for another session. Hence, with J = {1}, he directly deduces
He can proceed to recover all other bits by ruling out sessions in which c cannot be deduced. This way, he can always compute c and deduce
This can be used as follows to recover all bits based on the guess of x m : assuming x m , x 1 , . . . , x j−1 are known, the attack with J = {j} will reveal the response to either k i or e i for i = 1, . . . , j − 1 (while x i is known), and the response to both k j and e j . So, for each i ≤ j we know two out of the three values x i , k i , e i . The above relation allows to compute the third one iteratively for each i ≤ j, so deduce x j . The expected number of sessions to recover all bits is here less than 4m. Indeed, the key has length m and the probability of deducing c is larger than the probability that c 0 = 0 and x m = k m , which is 1/4.
MiM Attack on the "Modular Addition with Random Factor DBENC"
We consider here
freshly selected for each encryption, and some number prime n of m bits. 5 We denote e = ux − k mod n.
We have e = (ux mod n) − k + cn, where c = 1 k>ux mod n . By looking at the least significant bit (i.e., J = {1}), we note that
For simplicity reasons, we assume that x ∈ Z * n . Therefore, (ux mod n) ∈ U Z * n . In sessions where k m and k m−1 are revealed and happen to be both 1 (i.e., c m = c m−1 = 0 and r m = r m−1 = 1), the probability that c = 1 is
Hence, we can rule out other sessions (we need 16 sessions to have one unruled), and consider that c is a biased bit with P[c = 1] ≥ 3/4. Next, by writing u = 2u mod n, we observe that
The function 1 u x mod n≥ n 2 is sometimes called the most significant bit of u x mod n in the literature, although it is not always the most significant bit in the binary representation. For this reason, we write it M 1 (u x mod n). Hence, our attack recovers some (u , M 1 (u x mod n) ⊕ c) pairs. The problem of finding x is then called the Hidden Number with Noise Problem (HNNP) [5] .
More generally, we have lsb (ux mod n) = e + k − cn mod 2 . By setting J = {1, . . . , }, we recover lsb (ux mod n) with probability 2 − . We filter sessions for which k m , . . . , k m− +1 are revealed and are all 1 so that P[c = 1] ≥ 1 − 2 − . We need 2 +2 sessions to get one sample. We have that
This is an one-to-one mapping of M (u x mod n) = u x mod n n/2 .
The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) was introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [5] to prove the hardness of the most significant bits of the secret keys in Diffie-Hellman schemes. In HNP, for a given prime n and a given generator g of Z * n , the aim is to find a hidden number α ∈ Z * n by querying an oracle which has access to a function L n, ,α such that
This leads to two versions of the problem called randomized or sampling HNP. In our case, x is chosen uniformly and independently at random in Z * n . BonehVenkatesan [5] solved this problem by providing an algorithm which works for any ≥ ε √ log n in running time polynomial in log n for all > 0. Hence, it can work in practice with a very low . It also works with noise provided that 2 ≥ log n.
It requires D samples to recover x according to [32] (where, in [5] , D is equal to 2 √ log n). The complexity is n O(1/ log log n) for = log log n (or even = 2 but with an oracle to find the L ∞ -closest vector in a lattice). Therefore, we have a practical attack (even though not polynomial) using 2 2 × 2 × D sessions. The attack runs as follows:
1: for each session do 2: if it leaks k m , . . . , k m− +1 , and all bits are 1 then 3: if the attack with J = {1, . . . , } reveals lsb (e) and lsb (k) then 4: deduce u and M (u x mod n) (except with probability ≤ 2 − )
5:
stop when D such pairs are deduced Since such a short distance is quite unusual in a volume of this size, this is likely to be indeed the closest vector. If it is found, then x can be deduced.
Feasibility of the Latter Attack
The latter attack is the most intricate and demanding of all the attacks in this section. Thus, we endeavored in studying its practical feasibility. We hereby report our findings.
Implementation Details. In our implementation, we used a modified version of the lattice reduction of HNP in [5] : the basis reduction is done with the BKZ (Block Korkin-Zolotarev) [36] algorithm 6 , and the closest vector is found using Babai's closest plane algorithm [3] . These algorithms are implemented in NTL [37] and, in our coding of the attack, we use these implementations.
Implementation Results. In our implementation, we are mainly interested in the number of protocol sessions needed to perform the attack, for a given length of the modulus. Table 1 reports the above aim, together with the variation of several key parameters presented in the previous section. When we called the BKZ algorithm with its default NTL parameters, we obtained the respective number of protocol sessions reported in the table. When we manually tuned some of BKZ's parameters through extensive experiments, we succeeded in a slight reduction in this number of sessions. This improvement is reported with underlined figures in our table of results (i.e., in line 3, we show a drop from 2 16 to 2 15 in number of sessions, through adjusting BKZ's calling-parameters).
Note that-up to some point-we can achieve a time/accuracy trade-off (and implicitly lower ). Namely, one can β-block reduce 7 the basis of a lattice to get much better closest vector solutions [36] , where β is at most the size of the lattice (in our case, we have β = D + 1, with D ∈ O( √ log n) as in the table) . If the size of the modulus is small, β will increase, but we can always increase D to lower (and require less sessions), and choose a sensible value for β. This trade-off can reduce the number of sessions by a few, but it can dramatically increase the running time. These facts were also confirmed experimentally. In the implemented attack, we took = 3. Below, we report values that yield efficient attacks. 
On Strengthening/Fixing DBENC (and DB in general)
As we showed, the DBENC protocols (e.g., variants of Reid et al. [34] ) are vulnerable to reasonable MiM attacks. In this section, we assess the possible (existent or to-be-found) alternative. DBPK appeared with the aim of protecting against terrorist-fraud [15] . Some other protocols followed its path in more recent years. We briefly discuss now such descendants and their countermeasures to attacks. On the one hand, the Swiss-Knife protocol [25] can counter terrorist fraud, and-by using a MAC and a secret sharing scheme-it eliminates the pattern of insecurity by Kim [25] that we extend to full statistical attacks in here. On the other hand, the Tu and Piramuthu protocol [39] is fully susceptible to the type of attacks described in here (see [31] for more on the insecurity of Tu and Piramuthu's protocol). As per the actual DBPK protocol itself, we also consider that a first way in which it could improve its insecurity status consists of changing the proof of knowledge into the authentication of the protocol exchanges. Another way is that of employing different encryption functions or other cryptographic primitives comparing to those proposed by the authors.
Unfortunately, changing the encryption to some more involved scheme leads to other vulnerabilities against terrorist fraud, as shown by Hancke [20] .
Most importantly, the sad aspect in DB is that most arguments of security (and insecurity for that matter) are heuristic. And, other, completely different patterns of attacks have been exposed recently [6] for a large class of DB protocols. That attack pattern demolished the PRF assumption, which has been voidly invoked in some security arguments for DB protocols. In that sense, even in the Bussard-Bagga protocol, it should not be sufficient to replace the encryption by a PRF in a vacuous manner, i.e., with no further conditions/proofs.
We personally consider that the solution of basing the responses on preestablished sub-secrets and on secrets by using a secret sharing scheme [2] (along with other assessed modifications) is viable.
Nevertheless, this brief encounter into the status of DBPK-Log and DBPK's descendants goes to show that the threats exhibited are real and should carefully be considered, especially in implementations of (these terrorist-fraud protecting) DB.
Consequently, we emphasize that what is really missing is a clear, sound security model for DB, where resistance to terrorist-fraud and resistance to MiM can provably co-exist.
Conclusions
In this paper, we raise the signal that distance fraud, terrorist fraud, and MiM attacks can be launched against allegedly secure existing distance-bounding protocols. We show intricate applications of this attack-scenario, using statistical and theoretical analyses. These concrete frauds are respectively performed against the different proposed instantiations and successors of the DBPK distance-bounding protocols [8] [9] [10] . We present a distance fraud and a terrorist fraud against DBPKLog, thus disproving its very purpose. Our non-narrow MiM adversaries can therein retrieve all or several bits of the secret key, depending on the used encryption scheme in the respective instantiation of DBENC, i.e. variants of Reid et al. [34] . We present an implementation and short evaluation of the most demanding of these attacks. Our results show that a bad choice of the encryption function inside concrete instantiations of proposed protocol-schemas can lead to MiM attacks. This vouches for our feeling that this serious attack-strategy possibly finds applications in many other DB protocols. Simple fixes (replacing the encryption with a PRF) may not be the way forward either [6] , the insecurity problems and the absence of necessary and sufficient conditions to describe DB security being maybe at the core of these issues. Further, this dwells within the lack of sound, clear security models for DB with accompanying provably secure protocols. We herein provide some cases in point.
